Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. Researchers, meanwhile, have sought to understand the distinctive ways in which this broad group — which hails from many different countries, all with their own unique sub-cultures — has settled in the United States, assimilated into myriad communities and continued to understand its own hybrid identities.
Issues of discrimination, as well as potential radicalization spurred by global terror groups, are front and center in public discourse, but there are many other important issues, from education to economics, that might be explored by news media. The following studies provide nuance and texture to issues relating to Muslim Americans that go well beyond the political claims and the news headlines.
Critical Sociology , April Qualitative in-depth interviews with 48 Muslim Americans reveal they experience more intense forms of questioning and contestation about their status as an American once they are identified as a Muslim. Because Islam has become synonymous with terrorism, patriarchy, misogyny, and anti-American sentiments, when participants were identified as Muslims they were treated as if they were a threat to American cultural values and national security.congdong.bancongxanh.com/12459.php
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Their racialization occurred when they experienced de-Americanization, having privileges associated with citizenship such as being viewed as a valued member of society denied to them. This article highlights the importance of gender in the process of racialization. It also demonstrates the need for race scholarship to move beyond a black and white paradigm in order to include the racialized experiences of second and third generations of newer immigrants living in the USA. American Psychologist , April The overwhelming pressures faced by this group, including surveillance, hate crimes, and institutional discrimination, stimulate an urgent need for psychologists to better understand and ensure the well-being of this population.
This article reviews challenges in conducting research with Muslim Americans in order to offer recommendations for culturally sensitive approaches that can enhance the growth of future scholarship. We first contextualize this endeavor by assessing trends in psychological scholarship pertinent to Muslims in North America over the past two decades.
Researchers who conducted these studies faced numerous barriers, including unclear definition of the target sample, unavailability of culturally sensitive measures, sampling difficulties, and obstacles to participant recruitment. To navigate these challenges, we provide a framework for effective research design along the continuum of the research process from study conceptualization to dissemination of results.
The challenges and recommendations are illustrated with examples from previous studies. Review of Religious Ressearch, December This study investigates the demographic and religious behavior correlates of mosque-based social support among a multi-racial and ethnic sample of young Muslims from southeast Michigan.
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Results indicated that women both received and anticipated receiving greater support than did men. Higher educational attainment was associated with receiving and giving less support compared to those with the lowest level of educational attainment. Moreover, highly educated members reported fewer negative interactions than less educated members. Mosque attendance and level of congregational involvement positively predicted receiving, giving, and anticipated emotional support from congregants, but was unrelated to negative interactions.
Overall, the study results converge with previously established correlates of church-based emotional support. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion , September This study examines the effects of religious and political factors on views of politically motivated violence PMV. We close with study limitations and avenues of future research. American Quarterly , March These predictable strategies can be relied on if the plot involves an Arab or Muslim terrorist, but are a new standard alternative to and seem a great improvement on the stock ethnic villains of the past.
I argue that simplified complex representations are the representational mode of the so-called postrace era, signifying a new standard of racial representations. These representations often challenge or complicate earlier stereotypes yet contribute to a multicultural or postrace illusion. American Behavioral Scientist , June These brash new entrants into the crowded freewheeling world of extremist cyber-haters joined racists, religious extremists of other faiths, Islamophobes, single issue proponents, as well as anti-government rhetoriticians and conspiracists.
The danger from these evolving new provocateurs, then and now, is not that they represent a viewpoint that is widely shared by American Muslims. However, the earlier successful forays by extremist Salafists, firmly established the Internet as a tool to rapidly radicalize, train and connect a growing, but small number of disenfranchised or unstable young people to violence. The protections that the First Amendment provide to expression in the United States, contempt for Western policies and culture, contorted fundamentalism, and the initial successes of these early extremist Internet adopters, outlined here, paved the way for the ubiquitous and sophisticated online radicalization efforts we see today.
Social Problems , May At the micro level, results from the Detroit Arab American Study show that personally experiencing repression enhances protest participation most strongly for those whose Arab identity is not especially salient.
This is one of the first studies to demonstrate that repression can be especially mobilizing for those who under other circumstances would be least likely to protest. By comparison, in countries where Islam is not legally favored, roughly a third or fewer Muslims say sharia should be the law of the land.
Asked whether religious judges should decide family and property disputes, at least half of Muslims living in countries that have religious family courts answer yes. When comparing Muslim attitudes toward sharia as official law and its specific application in the domestic sphere, three countries are particularly instructive: Lebanon, Tunisia and Turkey. In Lebanon, Islam is not the favored religion of the state, but the major Muslim sects in the country operate their own courts overseeing family law.
As part of these changes, traditional sharia courts were eliminated in the s. The survey finds that religious devotion also shapes attitudes toward sharia. In Russia, for example, Muslims who say they pray several times a day are 37 percentage points more likely to support making sharia official law than Muslims who say they pray less frequently.
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Similarly, in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Tunisia, Muslims who say they pray several times a day are at least 25 percentage points more supportive of enshrining sharia as official law than are less observant Muslims. Across the countries surveyed, support for making sharia the official law of the land generally varies little by age, gender or education. In the few countries where support for Islamic law varies significantly by age, older Muslims tend to favor enshrining sharia as the law of the land more than younger Muslims do.
In most countries, Muslims with a secondary degree or higher i. When Muslims around the world say they want sharia to be the law of the land, what role do they envision for religious law in their country? First, many, but by no means all, supporters of sharia believe the law of Islam should apply only to Muslims. In addition, those who favor Islamic law tend to be most comfortable with its application to questions of family and property.
But in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, medians of more than half back both severe criminal punishments and the death penalty for Muslims who renounce their faith. Muslims who favor making sharia the law of the land generally agree that the requirements of Islam should apply only to Muslims. This view is prevalent even in regions such as South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, where there is overwhelming support for enshrining sharia as the official law of the land.
At the country level, there are notable exceptions to the view that sharia should apply only to Muslims. Sharia supporters around the world widely agree that Muslim leaders and religious judges should decide family and property disputes. The median is the middle number in a list of numbers sorted from highest to lowest. On many questions in this report, medians are reported for groups of countries to help readers see regional patterns.
For a region with an odd number of countries, the median on a particular question is the middle spot among the countries surveyed in that region. For regions with an even number of countries, the median is computed as the average of the two countries at the middle of the list e. Regardless of whether they support making sharia the official law of the land, Muslims around the world overwhelmingly agree that in order for a person to be moral, he or she must believe in God.
Muslims across all the regions surveyed also generally agree that certain behaviors — such as suicide, homosexuality and consuming alcohol — are morally unacceptable. However, Muslims are less unified when it comes to the morality of divorce, birth control and polygamy. Even Muslims who want to enshrine sharia as the official law of the land do not always line up on the same side of these issues. The survey asked Muslims if it is necessary to believe in God to be moral and have good values.
For the majority of Muslims, the answer is a clear yes. The question was not asked in Afghanistan. Muslims around the world also share similar views about the immorality of some behaviors. For example, across the six regions surveyed, median percentages of roughly eight-in-ten or more consistently say prostitution, homosexuality and suicide are morally wrong.
Moral attitudes are less uniform when it comes to questions of polygamy, divorce and family planning. In the other regions surveyed, attitudes toward polygamy vary widely from country to country. In other regions, fewer share this view, although opinions vary substantially at the country level.
Many Muslims say that divorce is either not a moral issue or that the morality of ending a marriage depends on the situation. In the Middle East and North Africa, for instance, more than a quarter of Muslims in five of the six countries where the question was asked say either that divorce is not a moral issue or that it depends on the context. Muslims also are divided when it comes to the morality of birth control.
In most countries where the question was asked, there was neither a clear majority saying family planning is morally acceptable nor a clear majority saying it is morally wrong. In addition, the survey finds that sharia supporters in different countries do not necessarily have the same views on the morality of divorce and family planning. For example, in Bangladesh and Lebanon, supporters of sharia are at least 11 percentage points more likely than other Muslims to say divorce is morally acceptable.
But in Albania, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kosovo and Kyrgyzstan, those who want sharia to be official law are less likely than other Muslims to characterize divorce as morally acceptable. Sharia supporters in different countries also diverge in their attitudes toward family planning. In Bangladesh, Jordan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims who want to enshrine sharia as the law of land are more likely to say family planning is moral, while in Kazakhstan, Russia, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan, supporters of sharia are less likely to say limiting pregnancies is morally acceptable.
For more details on views toward polygamy, divorce and family planning, see Morality and Marriage in Chapter 3: Morality. In most parts of the world, Muslims say that a woman should be able to decide whether to wear a veil. Yet when it comes to private life, most Muslims say a wife should always obey her husband. Across five of the six major regions included in the study, majorities of Muslims in most countries say a woman should be able to decide for herself whether to wear a veil in public.
Yet in the remaining countries, women are just as likely as men to say that the question of veiling should not be left to individual women. Muslims around the world strongly reject violence in the name of Islam. Asked specifically about suicide bombing, clear majorities in most countries say such acts are rarely or never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies.
In most countries where the question was asked, roughly three-quarters or more Muslims reject suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians. And in most countries, the prevailing view is that such acts are never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies. Yet there are some countries in which substantial minorities think violence against civilians is at least sometimes justified.
The survey finds little evidence that attitudes toward violence in the name of Islam are linked to factors such as age, gender or education. Similarly, the survey finds no consistent link between support for enshrining sharia as official law and attitudes toward religiously motivated violence. In only three of the 15 countries with sufficient samples sizes for analysis — Egypt, Kosovo and Tunisia — are sharia supporters significantly more likely to say suicide bombing and other forms of violence are at least sometimes justified.
In Bangladesh, sharia supporters are significantly less likely to hold this view. In a majority of countries surveyed, at least half of Muslims say they are somewhat or very concerned about religious extremism. And on balance, more Muslims are concerned about Islamic than Christian extremist groups. In all but one of the 36 countries where the question was asked, no more than one-in-five Muslims express worries about Christian extremism, compared with 28 countries where at least that many say they are concerned about Islamic extremist groups.
Although many Muslims are concerned about Islamic extremist groups, relatively few think tensions between more and less observant Muslims pose a major problem for their country. Similarly, most do not see Sunni-Shia hostilities as a major problem. And when asked specifically about relations between Muslims and Christians, majorities in most countries see little hostility between members of the two faiths.
In the Middle East and North Africa, a median of one-in-four say tensions between more and less devout Muslims is a pressing issue in their country. Across the seven countries where the question was asked, fewer than four-in-ten Muslims consider tensions between Sunnis and Shias to be a major national problem.
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However, levels of concern vary considerably. The survey asked in particular about relations between Muslims and Christians. In nearly all countries, fewer than half of Muslims say that many or most members of either religious group are hostile toward the other group. Most Muslims around the world express support for democracy, and most say it is a good thing when others are very free to practice their religion. At the same time, many Muslims want religious leaders to have at least some influence in political matters.
Given a choice between a leader with a strong hand or a democratic system of government, most Muslims choose democracy.
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